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GUEST WORKERS AND JUSTICE IN A SECOND-
BEST WORLD
Howard F. Chang*
ABSTRACT
This essay offers a defense ofguest-worker programs and a critique of the
objections raised by Michael Walzer and by other critics ofsuch programs.
Although critics commonly complain that guest workers are vulnerable to
exploitation by employers, we can design guest-worker programs that
minimize the risk ofsuch exploitation. Ready access for relatively unskilled
guest workers to citizenship and to public benefits, however, generates a
fiscal burden for the public treasury. A right to equal treatment for aliens
yields perverse results unless aliens are also entitled to equal concern when
the host country decides whether to admit the alien to its labor market. By
failing to extend such concern and favoring the interests of incumbent
residents instead, Walzer harms alien workers by endorsing the alternative
ofexclusion. A cosmopolitan theory ofjustice that extends equal concern to
all persons worldwide avoids such a perverse result by raising a
presumption in favor of the free movement ofworkers across borders. The
problem with this approach is the failure of most citizens to adopt such a
cosmopolitan view ofjustice and their reluctance to bear the fiscal burden
that such liberal policies would impose. Given the political infeasibility of
the liberal policies implied by ideal principles ofjustice, we should adopt an
expanded guest-worker program as a second-best policy that represents an
improvement over the status quo alternative of exclusion. We can expand
the rights of guest workers to include the right to change employers, the
right to bring their immediate families with them, the option ofpermanent
residence, and the opportunity to naturalize under appropriate conditions
after a sufficiently long period of alienage. We can adopt these reforms
without imposing a fiscal burden on natives, thereby bringing these reforms
within the realm ofthe politically feasible .
• Earle Hepburn Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Copyright © 2008 by
Howard F. Chang. I would like to thank symposium participants at the University of Dayton School of
Law for helpful comments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the number of unauthorized immigrants currently living
among us estimated to be about twelve million, l it seems apparent that we
need immigration reform, but the country is bitterly divided over what we
must do. For those who advocate comprehensive immigration reform, the
changes in our immigration laws must include expanded opportunities for
relatively unskilled alien workers to gain legal access to our labor markets.
President George W. Bush proposed that we use large-scale guest-worker
programs in an attempt to satisfy the large and persistent demand for
relatively unskilled labor in the United States that attracts so many
unauthorized immigrants? In fact, both the reform bill passed by the Senate
in 2006 and the compromise bill considered by the Senate in 2007 would
have created such programs.3 Thus, recent reform proposals debated in
Congress would have brought relatively unskilled alien workers into the
United States on nonimmigrant visas rather than on immigrant visas.
From the perspective of the economic interests of natives, guest-
worker programs may be an optimal response to concerns regarding the
impact of relatively unskilled alien workers on the public treasury.
Empirical evidence suggests that relatively unskilled immigrants on average
have a net negative fiscal impact on natives in the United States.4 Through
guest-worker programs, natives enjoy the benefits generated by these
workers in the labor market but do not bear the fiscal burden of providing
the full set of public benefits that these workers would receive if they had
ready access to permanent residence and, ultimately, citizenship. Although
immigrants can gain full access to public benefits upon naturalization, only
aliens "admitted for permanent residence" may naturalize as U.S. citizens.s
Alien workers admitted only on nonimmigrant visas are not admitted as
permanent residents and are thus not eligible for most public entitlements
and are not eligible to naturalize. Our laws generally exclude not only
unauthorized immigrants but also nonimmigrants, including temporary
I Jeffrey S. Passel, Pew Hispanic Center, A Pew Research Center Project, Publication, Modes of
Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population 3, 6, http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets!
factsheet.php?FactsheetlD=19 (May 22, 2006). The total population of the United States reached 300
million in October 2006. See Sam Roberts, A 300 Millionth American. Don't Ask Who., 53 N.Y. Times
AI5 (Oct. 18,2006).
2 See e.g. Pres. Bush Renews Call for a Temporary Worker Program, 82 Interpreter Releases 274
(2005); President Bush Announces Immigration Initiative, 81 Interpreter Releases 33 (2004).
3 See Sen. 1639, I 10th Congo (June 28, 2007); Sen. 2611. 109th Congo (May 25, 2006); Thomas
Alexander Aleinikoff et aI., Immigrarion and Citizenship: Process and Policy 459-60 (6th ed., West
2008); Senate Passes Immigration Bill, Conference Needed to Resolve Senate and House Differences, 83
Interpreter Releases 1037 (2006).
4 The National Research Council found in 1996 that the average immigrant with less than a high-
school education imposed a net fiscal cost of $13,000 in net present value, even after taking into account
the fiscal benefits that the immigrant's descendants would confer in the future. See Natl. Research
Council, The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects ofImmigration 334 (James P.
Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., Natl. Acad. Press 1997).
5 8 U.S.c. § 1427(a) (2000).
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workers, from a broad range of public benefits. With only narrow
exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for "any Federal public benefit.,,6
Because guest-worker programs can give relatively unskilled aliens access
to our labor markets without necessarily providing full access to the benefits
provided to citizens, these programs may allow the most liberal admissions
policies possible for these aliens without imposing a fiscal burden on
natives.
Jorge Durand and Douglas Massey report that "most migrants seek
to work abroad only temporarily" and argue that guest-worker programs
would satisfy the desire of migrants to do SO.7 If citizens are unwilling to
admit relatively unskilled workers as legal permanent residents because they
anticipate the fiscal burden that such admissions would entail, then we could
use guest-worker programs instead to address the demand for such workers
and the demand of the guest workers themselves for temporary visas. Alien
workers would gain from having a legal alternative to illegal entry and life
as an unauthorized immigrant, which leaves them subject to deportation by
the government and vulnerable to abuse by employers.
From the perspective of the interest of the aliens, or from the
perspective of liberal principles of justice, however, the ideal policy would
provide the option of permanent residence and access to citizenship. Liberal
ideals would treat these alien workers as equals, entitled to access to
citizenship and to the full set of public benefits provided to citizens. This
perspective suggests that if we admit workers to our labor market, then we
must extend the benefits of full membership to them as well. From this
perspective, by admitting unskilled workers, we make them objects of our
concern and thus worthy recipients of citizenship and the full set of benefits
that we provide to natives. The political theorist Michael Walzer takes such
a position, claiming that a society that relies on guest-worker programs to
meet its labor needs is "a little tyranny,"S in which guest workers "are
ruled .. , by a band of citizen-tyrants.,,9 Walzer argues that the
disenfranchisement of guest workers violates the "principle of political
justice" in a "democratic state."lO
In this essay, I offer a defense of guest-worker programs and a
critique of the objections raised by Walzer and by other critics of such
programs. These objections may be interpreted either narrowly or broadly.
In Part I, I respond to Walzer's narrow objection, which complains that
guest workers have been vulnerable to exploitation. I suggest that we can
6 8 U.S.c. § 1611(a) (2000).
7 Jorge Durand & Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Sanity, Am. Prospect 29 (Sept. 24, 2001)
(available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=borderline_sanity).
8 Michael Walzer, Spheres ofJustice.' A Defense ofPluralism and Equality 52 (Basic Books, Inc.,
Publishers 1983).
9 Id. at 58.
10 Id. at 60.
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design guest-worker programs that mInImIZe the risk of exploitation by
employers. In Part II, I tum to a broader claim based on the right of guest
workers to equality and to citizenship. I argue that this broader claim yields
perverse results unless aliens are also entitled to equal concern when the
host country decides whether to admit the alien to its labor market. By
failing to extend such concern, Walzer harms alien workers by endorsing the
alternative of exclusion.
In Part III, I argue that a cosmopolitan theory of justice that extends
equal concern to all persons worldwide avoids such a perverse result by
raising a presumption in favor of the free movement of workers across
borders. The problems with this approach are the failure of most citizens to
adopt such a cosmopolitan view of justice and their reluctance to bear the
fiscal burden that such liberal policies would impose. In Part IV, I conclude
that given the political infeasibility of the liberal policies implied by ideal
principles of justice, we should adopt a liberalized guest-worker program as
a second-best policy that represents an improvement over the status quo
alternative of exclusion. We can expand the rights of guest workers to
include the right to change employers, the right to bring their immediate
families with them, the option of permanent residence, and the opportunity
to naturalize under appropriate conditions after a sufficiently long period of
alienage. I argue that we can adopt these reforms without generating a fiscal
burden for the public treasury, thereby bringing these reforms within the
realm of the politically feasible.
II. EXPLOITATION
Walzer declares his principle of justice in sweeping and absolute
terms: "Men and women are either subject to the state's authority, or they
are not; and if they are subject, they must be given a say, and ultimately an
equal say, in what that authority does.,,11 Is the line between tyranny and
democracy, however, such a simple matter of black and white? After all,
other aliens present in the United States as nonimmigrants, such as tourists,
business visitors, and students, are "subject to the state's authority," just as
guest workers are. Is Walzer suggesting that all those other nonimmigrants
must also "be set on the road to citizenship"12 simply because they are
"subject to the state's authority" in a democratic state? Elsewhere, Walzer
qualifies his claim without further explanation, stating that "the processes of
self-determination through which a democratic state shapes its internal life,
must be open, and equally open, to all those men and women who live
within its territory, work in the local economy, and are subject to local law,"
yet even here he concedes that his "argument doesn't plausibly apply to
Illd.at6J.
12 Id. at 60.
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privileged guests," such as "technical advisors, visiting professors, and so
on."l3 If his argument is to be limited, then there must be something
especially disturbing about the typical guest worker that distinguishes those
aliens from other nonimmigrants.
Perhaps guest workers are different, because they are often
relatively uneducated aliens and therefore may be especially vulnerable to
abuse or exploitation by their employers. Walzer distinguishes guest
workers from "tourists," noting that guest workers "are typically an
exploited or oppressed class.,,14 He draws this conclusion from a description
of guest-worker programs "based chiefly on the legal situation in the early
1970s.,,15 Similarly, other critics of guest-worker programs often point to
"the real and perceived abuses of past' guest worker' programs" such as the
Bracero program in effect from 1942 to 1964 in the United States. 16 Kevin
Johnson, for example, complains that the Bracero program "created an
exploitable and exploited cheap labor force" and asserts that "[t]here is no
reason to believe that a new 'temporary' worker program would be any
different. ,,17
Past programs, including the Bracero program, however, tied each
guest worker to a specific employer, and there is no need for guest-worker
programs to limit the worker's mobility in this way in the future. Freedom
to leave an employer and to take employment elsewhere would give workers
greater power to assert their rights against employers and thus prevent
abuses, without either destroying the economic gains that natives enjoy from
employing alien workers or generating a fiscal burden. The bill passed by
the Senate in 2006, for example, would have allowed guest workers to
change employers. 18 The portability of the guest worker's visa allowed the
bill to win the support of Hispanic groups such as La Raza. As the president
of the National Council of La Raza explained: "Workers would not be at
the mercy of abusive employers in that they could change jobs and alert the
authorities to mistreatment.,,19 Similarly, Durand and Massey argue that
"the right to change jobs would free them to participate in unions and to
report violations of their labor rights. ,,20
An ideal program would offer the guest worker full mobility,
including the ability to move freely among various sectors of the economy.
13 Id. (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 59.
15 Id. at 56.
16 Daniel T. Griswold, Center for Trade Policy Studies, Willing Workers: Fixing the Problem of
Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States 19, http://www.freetrade.orglpubs/pas/tpa-019.pdf (Oct.
15,2002).
J7 Kevin R. Johnson, Legal Immigration in the 21st Century, in Center for Immigration Studies,
Blueprintsfor an Ideal Legal Immigration Policy 37,41 (Richard D. Lamm & Alan Simpson eds., 2001).
18 See Sen. 2611, 109th Congo (2006); Aleinikoff, supra n. 3, at 459.
19 Janet Murguia, A Change ofHeart on Guest Workers, Wash. Post B7 (Feb. I I, 2007).
20 Durand & Massey, supra n. 7, at 28.
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As Daniel Griswold observes, "complete mobility" not only among different
employers but also among different sectors of the economy would give
workers "full freedom to change jobs" and thus to obtain the highest wages
and best working conditions available?l This mobility would be best not
only for the guest worker but also for the efficiency of the labor market,
because it "would allow the supply of labor to shift" among sectors in
response to changing market demand.22 Once guest workers are free to seek
any job in the United States, then all sectors of the economy can benefit
from hiring them.
Once we give the guest worker the same rights in the workplace
enjoyed by citizens, we greatly reduce the risk of exploitation by abusive
employers. If this risk is the ultimate source of Walzer's concern about
guest-worker programs, then his objection is really a matter of degree, and a
program that provides complete mobility for the guest worker seems much
less vulnerable to his objection. On the other hand, guest workers remain
"subject to the state's authority," and if Walzer really believes that all those
"subject to the state's authority" must be "given a say ... in what that
authority does," then complete mobility for the guest worker would not be
an adequate response to his broader objection.
III. THE IMMIGRATION PARADOX
Can Walzer really mean it when he claims that all those "subject to
the state's authority" must be "given a say ... in what that authority does,"
given his other views on immigration policy? After all, prospective
immigrants who seek to enter the United States are also "subject to the
state's authority," specifically, the state's authority to regulate immigration.
The broader principle of justice stated by Walzer would seem to imply that
the prospective immigrant must be "given a say ... in what that authority
does," including that authority's restrictions on immigration. Yet Walzer
also claims that national governments should have a relatively free hand in
restricting immigration.23
In such a moral framework, the immigration of relatively unskilled
workers poses a fundamental problem for liberals?4 Ready access to
citizenship and all public benefits for a large number of relatively unskilled
immigrants would probably prove to be costly for the public treasury. The
empirical evidence suggests that unskilled alien workers are likely to have a
net negative fiscal impact if granted ready access to citizenship. Thus, if the
21 Griswold, supra n. 16, at 19.
22 ld.
. 23 Walzer, supra n. 8, at 35-48.
24 The following discussion draws from an earlier publication by Howard F. Chang, The
Immigration Paradox: Poverty, Distributive Justice, and Liberal Egalitarianism, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 759,
769-71 (2003).
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welfare of incumbent residents determines admissions policies, and we
anticipate the fiscal burden that the immigration of the poor would impose,
then a decision to favor the interests of incumbent residents would preclude
the admission of relatively unskilled workers in the first place. This moral
stance produces an anomaly: Our commitment to treat these workers as
equals once admitted would cut against their admission and thereby make
them worse off than they would be if we rejected such a commitment.
Walzer would urge us to exclude the alien worker rather than admit that
alien as a guest worker. But why should we choose the alternative of
exclusion, which makes the excluded alien even worse off than the
alternative of a guest-worker program?
By agreeing to obligations of distributive justice toward alien
workers if admitted, we harm them. These aliens would be better off if we
agreed never to care about their welfare and never to treat them as equals. If
concern for the welfare of poor immigrants motivates generous fiscal
policies toward them, then it seems perverse to cite these policies as a
reason to exclude the very immigrants whose welfare we would seek to
improve through these public benefits. This moral stance is unsatisfactory
from the perspective of human welfare.
It seems incoherent to tum away the relatively unskilled alien, citing
a negative fiscal effect on current residents, given that we always have the
option of admitting that alien subject to restrictions on access to public
benefits. This less restrictive alternative would improve the welfare of both
the alien and current residents compared to the alternative of exclusion.
This admission would also transform the alien into a resident, however, and
if we care about the welfare of all residents, then the same distributive
concerns that justified generous policies for other poor residents would
apply to the poor immigrant as well.
This paradox lies at the heart of immigration policy. A commitment
to treat the immigrant as an equal can backfire against the alien seeking to
immigrate, because the immigrant's access to this equal concern does not
arise unless we admit the immigrant. If the act of admission triggers
obligations of justice, then we can avoid these obligations by choosing to
exclude. This stance begs the question of whether we can legitimately base
admission policies on the interests of incumbent residents alone.
Unless the admission decision itself also respects the alien as an
equal, the result is perverse. Thus, the source of the "irn..'1ligration paradox"
is the contingent nature of the obligation to treat the alien as an equal. That
is, this problem is inherent in making obligations of justice contingent on
admission. We cannot begin our normative analysis by assuming that we do
not admit the aliens in question. If we make obligations of justice
contingent on whether we admit them in the first place, then our normative
10 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1
framework becomes a function of our immigration policies and cannot
provide an independent standard that we can use to evaluate these policies.
IV. COSMOPOLITAN LIBERAL IDEALS AND POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
We can avoid the immigration paradox if we adopt a normative
criterion that is independent of our policy choices. Two options present
themselves. First, we could favor the interests of natives and discount the
interests of immigrants. This nativist perspective suggests guest-worker
programs as the optimal admission policy for relatively unskilled aliens.
Second, we can adopt a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern
to all individuals, including aliens. Either alternative provides a criterion
that is independent of our admission policies and thus avoids the circularity
that underlies the immigration paradox. The criterion that is consistent with
liberal ideals, however, is cosmopolitan rather than nativist. Only the
cosmopolitan perspective offers a satisfactory framework for the evaluation
of our immigration policies under a liberal theory ofjustice.
A cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to all
individuals, including aliens, would imply not only more generous fiscal
policies but also more liberal admission policies for relatively unskilled
workers than the nativist perspective would imply. Estimates of the gains
that the world could enjoy by liberalizing international migration indicate
that even partial liberalization would not only produce substantial increases
in the world's real income but also improve its distribution.25 If we begin
with equal concern for all persons, then immigration barriers are morally·
suspect and demand justification. All immigration restrictions discriminate
against individuals based on their alienage. Most aliens are born aliens
because our nationality laws deem them to be aliens based on immutable
characteristics, including the geographic location of their birth (that is,
national origin) and the citizenship of their parents at the time of their
birth?6 For a liberal society that declares that "all men are created equal,,,27
this discrimination based explicitly on circumstances of birth is at odds with
ideal principles of social justice.
The problem with the cosmopolitan escape from the "immigration
paradox" is the failure of most citizens to adopt such a cosmopolitan
perspective. Given this failure, cosmopolitan liberals face a constraint of
political feasibility that prevents realization of all their ideals. As a matter
of political reality, the interests of citizens have in fact played the dominant
~5 See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and
Migration 25-35 (World Bank 2006) (available at http://siteresources.worldbank.orgiINTGEP2006/
Resources/GEP_i-xii.pdf); Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency and Distributional Implications of
Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility, 141. Dev. Econ. 61, 70-74 (1984).
26 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; 8 U.S.c. § 1401 (2000).
27 The Declaration ofIndependence [~2] (1776).
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role in the public debate over immigration policies. This feature of the real
world may impose a constraint on the set of policy alternatives open to us as
a practical matter.
The cosmopolitan liberal would prefer that aliens have access both
to our labor market and to public benefits and citizenship. As a matter of
political reality, however, citizens are unlikely to admit aliens under those
generous conditions in the numbers that cosmopolitan ideals would require,
given the fiscal burden that those liberal policies would entail. As long as
citizens are reluctant to bear the fiscal burdens that cosmopolitan liberalism
would impose, they are likely to restrict access to permanent residence.
Given these constraints, cosmopolitan liberals face a tradeoff: significantly
liberalized access to our labor markets for relatively unskilled alien workers
will likely require some restrictions on alien access to public benefits and
citizenship to have a realistic chance of enactment.28 Under these
circumstances, guest-worker programs may represent the only alternative to
exclusion or illegal immigration for many aliens?9 These aliens would be
better served if liberals were to seek to improve these guest-worker
programs rather than to prevent their adoption or to eliminate them.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM
In light of the foregoing observations, we should adopt an expanded
guest-worker program as a matter of political necessity, given the fiscal
burden that the admission of a large number of relatively unskilled workers
would otherwise entail and the reluctance of citizens to bear such a burden.
Liberals should seek to minimize deviations from the ideal immigration
policy but at the same time must remain sensitive to the need to improve the
fiscal impact of relatively unskilled alien workers. How should we design a
guest-worker program with these considerations in mind?
For example, how should we respond to the common complaints
that guest workers often prefer to stay permanently and that it can be
difficult to ensure that these workers leave?3o One response is to make sure
a new guest-worker program has better incentives for workers to return
28 Empirical evidence indicates that immigrant access to public assistance generates significant
political opposition to immigration. See generally Gordon H. Hanson, Why Does Immigration Divide
America? Public Finance and Political Opposition 10 Open Borders (Ins!. for IntI. Econ. Aug. 2005);
Gordon H. Hanson, Kenneth Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, Public Finance and Individual Preferences
over Globalization Strategies, 19 Econ. & Pol. 1 (2007).
29 The following discussion draws from an earlier publication by Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals
and Political Feasibility: Guest-Worker Programs as Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C. J. IntI. L. & Com.
Reg. 465, 477-81 (2002).
30 See Philip L. Martin & Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers, 80 For.
Affairs 117, 119-20, ]24-25 (Nov.-Dec. 2001).
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home. 3 \ Perhaps the government of the host country could withhold a
fraction of a guest worker's wages to be paid only once the worker returns
to that worker's home country.
We could also accommodate the desire of guest workers to remain,
however, by lifting restrictions on the duration of their residence and
employment in the host country. As long as we restrict their access to
public benefits, they seem unlikely to impose a net fiscal burden on the
public treasury. After all, the National Research Council found in 1996 that
once we take the positive fiscal effect of an immigrant's descendants into
account, an immigrant with less than a high-school education imposes a net
fiscal cost of only $13,000 in net present value.32 Furthermore, the same
study also estimates that by excluding immigrants from seven specified
means-tested benefits for only their first five years in the United States,
welfare legislation passed in 1996 improved the total fiscal impact of the
average immigrant by $8,000.33 These estimates suggest that an alien who
never obtains access to these public benefits, as would be the case for a
guest worker with only a nonimmigrant visa, would probably have a net
positive fiscal impact even if the alien has less than a high-school education.
Indeed, we exclude nonimmigrants from an even broader set of public
benefits than those denied immigrants.34 Thus, it would not generate a fiscal
burden to allow guest workers to renew their nonimmigrant visas with no
limit on the number of possible renewals. If we allow guest workers to stay
as long as they wish, then this option would address the concerns expressed
by Christina Rodriguez, who worries that guest-worker programs often fail
to provide "the security of . . . the right to remain, or the security of a
continued presence,,,35 a failure which erects "obstacles to the integration
process" that incorporates "immigrants and their children" into the host
society.36
In fact, empirical evidence suggests that it would be in the interest
of natives to allow even relatively unskilled immigrants to bring their
immediate families with them, to allow their spouses to work, and to
encourage their children to remain permanently in the United States. The
National Research Council finds that on average, the fiscal impact of the
descendants of an immigrant "is always positive, regardless of the
31 See Philip L. Martin, Guest Workers: New Solution or New Problem? 2007 U. Chi. Leg. Forum
289,296 (2007) (suggesting that "the worker's share of payroll taxes could be refunded when the migrant
surrenders his or her work visa in the country of origin").
32 See Natl. Research Council, supra n. 4, at 334.
33 See id. at 339.
34 See 8 U.S.C § 1611(a).
35 Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and
Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. Chi. Leg. Forum 219, 223.
36 Id. at 222.
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immigrant's age at arrival and education level.,,3? Furthermore, the same
study finds that even relatively unskilled immigrants have a net positive
fiscal impact on average if they immigrate as children, because the younger
an immigrant is upon arrival, the more years of work the immigrant can
perform in the United States, and the more the immigrant will contribute in
taxes prior to retirement.38 Thus, the immigration of the children of even
relatively unskilled alien workers would improve the fiscal impact of those
workers. Indeed, the more children they bring, the larger the fiscal benefit
their immigration confers on the United States.
Giving guest workers the option of de facto permanent residence
while avoiding a net fiscal burden, however, requires us to restrict their
access to citizenship and to public benefits. To better reflect what
Rodriguez calls "the spirit of social cooperation that should characterize a
democratic society,,,39 we could offer guest workers the opportunity to
naturalize under appropriate conditions. For example, many reform
proposals would offer a path to citizenship for guest workers who compile a
record of employment and avoid criminal activity.40 Indeed, as the president
of La Raza noted approvingly, the bill passed by the Senate in 2006 would
have given guest workers "the opportunity to earn a path to permanent status
-- and ultimately citizenship.,,41 Thus, admission as a guest worker need not
entail permanent status as an alien.
Access to citizenship for relatively unskilled alien workers need not
impose a fiscal burden on incumbent residents if we require a sufficiently
long period of alienage before eligibility for naturalization. By requiring
guest workers to spend some years in nonimmigrant status first, we delay
their access to the full set of public benefits that we provide to citizens. This
delay itself would improve the fiscal impact of each immigrant. The longer
the delay, the greater the improvement in the immigrant's fiscal impact.
Thus, we could allow even a relatively unskilled immigrant to naturalize
without imposing a net fiscal burden if a sufficient period of alienage with
limited access to public benefits has passed. We could also require guest
workers to have paid a sufficient amount in taxes before they could adjust
their status, so as to ensure that those who adjust status are likely to have a
net positive fiscal impact.
37 Nat!' Research Council, supra n. 4, at 329. Note that these descendants confer a net fiscal benefit
even though the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides citizenship to anyone born in
the United States, including the children of non immigrants. See U.S. Const. amend. XN, § 1 ("All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside.").
38 See Nat!. Research Council, supra n. 4, at 328-29.
39 Rodriguez, supra n. 35, at 223.
40 Aleinikoff, supra n. 3, at 488.
41 Murguia, supra n. J 9, at B7.
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In reality, access to citizenship is a matter of degree. As Walzer
concedes, naturalization is subject to "constraints of time and
qualification.',42 Guest workers might have the opportunity to adjust status
only after a short period of residence or only after a long period. We might
demand a long work history and a large amount of taxes paid or impose less
stringent requirements. These requirements might be so lax as to ensure that
virtually all guest workers can eventually become citizens or so demanding
that only a few ultimately naturalize. Although Walzer seems to suggest
otherwise, there is no bright line in this spectrum of alternatives to separate
democracy from tyranny; there are only different shades of gray, different
degrees of deviation from liberal ideals. We could choose any point along
this continuum to satisfy restrictionists concerned about the fiscal impact of
relatively unskilled immigrants or the political impact of their naturalization
and participation in the electorate.
In fact, the 2007 bill considered by Congress would have given
guest workers the opportunity to apply for permanent residence through a
"new merit-based point system" and would have awarded some points for
years of "U.S. work experience.',43 By adjusting the points awarded for
work experience as a guest worker or by awarding points for taxes paid, and
by adjusting the total number of immigrant visas issued through such a
system, we can adjust the guest worker's prospects for permanent residence
and the number of years that a guest worker could expect to wait to adjust
status. By choosing an appropriate point along this continuum, Congress
can settle on a compromise that can make a large number of admissions for
relatively unskilled guest workers politically feasible.
From a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to
aliens and natives, expanded guest-worker programs represent an
improvement over the status quo alternative of exclusion. Therefore,
cosmopolitan liberals should support liberalizing reforms that include guest-
worker programs, even while seeking the broadest rights possible for aliens
within the constraints of political feasibility. While it would be a mistake to
pretend that this compromise is ideal from a liberal perspective, it would
also be a mistake to forego worthwhile reforms because they fall short of the
ideal.
42 Walzer, supra n. 8. at 60.
43 Aleinikoff, supra n. 3, at 461.
